Energy Policy & Industrial Strategy 23 February 2026 8 min read

How the UK Could Nationalise Energy Generation And Why It Might Matter More Than Ever

Redirecting current subsidies into public ownership could stabilise household bills and rebuild industrial strength

✍️ By UKPoliticsDecoded Editorial Team
Analysis of energy nationalisation through redirected public subsidies and offshore wind investment

For years, the UK has relied on private investment to build and operate the country's energy infrastructure. Offshore wind, solar farms, interconnectors, and even emerging technologies like hydrogen and carbon capture have all been shaped by a model where the state subsidises, guarantees, or underwrites private developers rather than directly owning the assets.

But with energy bills still high, public frustration growing, and the government already planning to create a publicly owned company GB Energy, a different question is emerging: why not build and own the generation capacity ourselves?

This isn't a fringe idea. It's a strategic one. And it's rooted in a simple observation: the UK is already spending billions on subsidies, tax incentives, and bespoke deals for private companies, including datacentre operators and software partnerships. Redirecting even a portion of that public money into publicly owned renewable infrastructure could fundamentally reshape the energy system.

⚑ Core Economic Arguments

  • Subsidy redirection: Β£7bn+ already committed to AI/datacentre infrastructure could build 2-3+ GW offshore wind
  • Long term returns: Publicly owned generation creates decades of stable revenue for reinvestment
  • Bill stabilisation: Public ownership insulates households from volatile wholesale markets
  • Industrial competitiveness: Cheaper electricity could reverse decades of deindustrialisation
  • Strategic autonomy: Reduced exposure to global gas markets and geopolitical energy shocks

πŸ’· Redirecting Public Subsidies Into Public Ownership

The government has committed substantial public funds to AI infrastructure, datacentres, sovereign compute, and software procurement. These investments are justified as supporting digital growth, but they also represent a major opportunity cost: the same money could build publicly owned renewable generation instead of subsidising private operators.

Here's what the current spending pot looks like:

πŸ’· Government AI & Datacentre Spending

Category Government Spending Notes / Impact
AI Infrastructure Β£2bn Funds compute, AI clusters, and datacentre linked infrastructure
Datacentre Investment Incentives Β£1bn Public support to attract private datacentre development
Sovereign Compute (Supercomputing) Β£1bn Publicly funded compute capacity for AI and research
Software & AI Contracts (recent years) Β£3.45bn Procurement spending on cloud, AI, and software services
Energy Subsidies for Datacentres Uncapped / ongoing Discounted electricity rates for hyperscalers
Total identifiable pot Β£7.45bn+ Enough to build multiple gigawatts of offshore wind

Even the Β£2–3bn infrastructure slice alone could fund a 1 GW publicly owned offshore wind farm. Redirecting Β£5–6bn could build 2 GW or more, enough to power over 2 million homes.

🌊 Offshore Wind: High Upfront Cost, Low Ongoing Cost

Offshore wind is capital intensive to build but relatively cheap to maintain. Once installed:

  • Operating costs are low
  • Turbines last 25–30+ years
  • Fuel is free
  • Revenue is stable and predictable

This is why private developers are so keen to build them, the long term returns are extremely attractive.

Here's what the same spending pot could achieve if redirected:

⚑ What This Could Build Instead (Public Ownership Model)

Reallocated Budget Offshore Wind Capacity Homes Powered Ownership Outcome
Β£2–3bn 1 GW ~1 million homes A single publicly owned wind farm
Β£5–6bn 2+ GW 2+ million homes A major public generation portfolio under GB Energy
Β£7bn+ 2.5–3 GW 3 million+ homes A foundational publicly owned renewable fleet

Once built, maintenance costs are minimal, and the revenue potential is significant.

πŸ“ˆ The Profitability Case: Public Assets, Public Returns

The economics of offshore wind are compelling:

πŸ“‰ Offshore Wind vs Wholesale Prices

Metric Offshore Wind Wholesale Market Implication
Levelised Cost of Energy Β£40–60/MWh β€” Very cheap to generate once built
Recent Wholesale Prices β€” Β£100–200/MWh High market prices create large profit margins
Public Profit Potential β€” β€” Surplus could fund more wind farms or public services

This gap between generation cost and wholesale price is where the public benefit lies. A publicly owned generator could reinvest profits into:

  • More offshore wind
  • Wave and tidal power
  • Grid scale storage
  • Local energy cooperatives
  • Industrial energy discounts

This is how national wealth is built: long term assets generating long term returns.

The Revenue Reinvestment Model

Norway's sovereign wealth fund was built on oil revenues. The UK could build a renewable wealth fund on wind revenues, creating a self expanding portfolio of clean generation that funds itself through market returns.


πŸ”‹ Using Profits to Invest in Next Generation Renewables

Once GB Energy owns a portfolio of offshore wind assets, the revenue could be reinvested into:

  • Wave power
  • Tidal stream technology
  • Floating offshore wind
  • Grid scale storage
  • Local energy cooperatives

These technologies are not yet commercially mature enough to attract large scale private investment without heavy subsidies. But a publicly owned generator with stable revenue could take a long term view.

This creates a virtuous cycle:

πŸ”„ The Reinvestment Cycle

  • Step 1: Publicly owned offshore wind generates stable revenue
  • Step 2: Profits fund next generation renewable R&D and deployment
  • Step 3: Expanded renewable portfolio generates more revenue
  • Step 4: Further investment in storage, grid infrastructure, and industrial support
  • Step 5: UK becomes a net exporter of renewable technology and electricity

🏭 Tackling Deindustrialisation Through Cheaper Energy

Energy costs are one of the biggest barriers to UK manufacturing competitiveness. High electricity prices:

  • Push factories overseas
  • Increase the cost of British goods
  • Reduce investment in new industrial capacity
  • Contribute to job losses and regional decline

If GB Energy generated electricity at cost without shareholder profit margins the government could:

  • Reduce industrial electricity prices
  • Support manufacturing and heavy industry
  • Encourage reshoring of production
  • Stabilise supply chains
  • Create new job vacancies in regions hit hardest by deindustrialisation

Countries with publicly owned energy, such as France, Norway, and Sweden, consistently have lower industrial electricity prices and stronger manufacturing bases.

🏭 Industrial Electricity Prices (2025 avg)

  • Germany (mixed model): €0.15-0.20/kWh
  • France (public ownership): €0.10-0.14/kWh
  • Norway (public ownership): €0.05-0.08/kWh
  • UK (private model): €0.18-0.25/kWh

πŸ“Š Manufacturing Competitiveness Impact

  • Energy intensive industries: Aluminium, steel, chemicals, glass
  • Cost advantage: 30-50% lower electricity costs possible
  • Job creation potential: Thousands of manufacturing roles
  • Regional impact: Particularly benefits post industrial areas

πŸ’‘ Preventing the Next Cost of Living Crisis

The UK's energy crisis was not caused by a lack of wind farms. It was caused by:

  • Exposure to volatile global gas markets
  • A privatised system that passes wholesale price spikes directly to consumers
  • A lack of publicly owned generation to stabilise prices

A publicly owned energy generator would act as a buffer.

When global prices spike, GB Energy could keep domestic prices stable because its costs are fixed and its profits are public.

The Insulation Theory

Public ownership is not about ideology, it's about insulation from volatility. When you own the generation, you control the price. When private companies own the generation, they control your bills.


πŸ“Š Price Stability Mechanisms

Public ownership enables multiple price stabilisation tools:

  • Fixed long term contracts: GB Energy could sell to suppliers at stable prices
  • Cross subsidy mechanisms: Industrial profits support household bill reduction
  • Strategic reserves: Revenue accumulated during profitable periods
  • Direct supply model: GB Energy could eventually supply households directly
  • Market intervention: Public capacity used to limit private price manipulation

🎯 A National Energy Strategy That Actually Uses GB Energy

Right now, GB Energy is being framed as a "co-investor" rather than a generator. But a co-investor model risks becoming little more than a public subsidy mechanism for private developers.

A more ambitious approach would be:

  • GB Energy builds and owns offshore wind farms
  • GB Energy sells electricity directly into the grid
  • GB Energy reinvests profits into new renewables and industrial support
  • GB Energy becomes a long term stabiliser of household bills

This would turn GB Energy into a genuine national asset, not a branding exercise.

❓ Current GB Energy Model

  • Co-investment role: Partners with private developers
  • Limited ownership: Minority stakes in private projects
  • Subsidy mechanism: Reduces private sector risk
  • Uncertain returns: Profits shared with private partners
  • Limited scale: Β£8bn budget spread across multiple projects

βœ… Public Ownership Model

  • Direct ownership: GB Energy owns 100% of assets
  • Full revenue capture: All profits return to public
  • Strategic control: Public interest drives decisions
  • Reinvestment focused: Profits fund more generation
  • Scalable model: Success enables rapid expansion

🌍 International Examples: Public Ownership Works

The UK doesn't need to invent this model it already exists successfully elsewhere:

πŸ›οΈ Global Public Energy Success Stories

  • Norway (Equinor): State owned energy giant, sovereign wealth fund built on energy profits
  • France (EDF): Majority state owned, provides some of Europe's cheapest electricity
  • Denmark (Ørsted): State owned offshore wind leader, profitable and expanding globally
  • Sweden (Vattenfall): State owned utility, major renewable investor across Europe
  • Austria (Verbund): Majority state owned, focuses on hydroelectric and renewable generation

These companies prove that public ownership can be:

  • Profitable and efficient
  • Technologically advanced
  • Internationally competitive
  • Consumer focused
  • Environmental leaders

βš–οΈ Addressing the Common Objections

πŸ’° "The Government Can't Afford It"

This argument ignores that the government is already spending the money, just differently:

  • Β£7bn+ on AI/datacentre subsidies short term spending with uncertain returns
  • Ongoing energy subsidies annual payments to private companies
  • Green investment bank precedent the UK successfully operated public energy investment before privatisation
  • Infrastructure borrowing capabilities government borrowing costs lower than private sector

🏒 "Private Sector is More Efficient"

Energy generation evidence challenges this assumption:

  • Overhead costs: Public generators avoid shareholder dividend payments (typically 5-8% of revenue)
  • Long term focus: Public ownership enables 25-30 year investment horizons
  • Risk allocation: Government already provides most major project risks through subsidies
  • International performance: State owned utilities often outperform private ones on cost and reliability

⚑ "Technology Risk is Too High"

Offshore wind is now mature, proven technology:

  • Operational track record: Thousands of turbines operating reliably
  • Predictable costs: Construction and maintenance costs well understood
  • Proven returns: Private investors actively competing for projects
  • Supply chain maturity: Established manufacturers and installation capabilities

🎬 Conclusion: Public Assets for Public Benefit

The UK faces a strategic choice about its energy future. It can continue subsidising private ownership while households face volatile bills and industry struggles with high energy costs. Or it can redirect existing public spending into publicly owned generation that delivers long term benefits.

The economic logic is compelling:

  • Β£7bn+ is already committed to digital infrastructure spending
  • The same money could build 2-3 GW of offshore wind
  • Publicly owned generation would provide decades of stable revenue
  • Profits could fund more renewables, industrial support, and bill reduction
  • The UK would be less exposed to global energy market volatility

🎯 The Strategic Benefits

  • Energy security: Reduced dependence on volatile global markets
  • Industrial revival: Cheaper electricity could reverse deindustrialisation
  • Household stability: Public ownership buffers against price spikes
  • Reinvestment potential: Profits fund next generation renewable technology
  • National wealth: Long term assets generating long term returns

This isn't about ideology, it's about economics. When private companies generate electricity, the profit goes to shareholders. When the public generates electricity, the profit goes to the public.

The question is whether GB Energy will become a genuine public asset that owns, generates, and reinvests or whether it will remain a co-investment fund that subsidises private development while the long term benefits flow elsewhere.

The money is already being spent. The technology is proven. The international examples exist.

What's missing is the political willingness to choose public returns over private profits in the energy system that powers everything else.